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?talo Calvino and What's Next: The Literature of 
Monstrous Possibility Curtis White 
I'D LIKE TO TALK about ?talo Calvino (particularly his two 
science-fictive books of stories, Cosmicomics and t zero) within the context 
of a more general discussion of "postmodernism" and John Barth 's idea 
of "the literature of exhaustion." I would begin by rectifying the almost 
universal misunderstanding of "the literature of exhaustion" (as another 
sign of the death of the novel), but, fortunately, Barth 's own later essay, 
"The Literature of Replenishment,"1 has already unambiguously set 
things straight. It is enough to say that Barth 's first essay, "The Litera 
ture of Exhaustion,"2 was not a gloomy prophesy of the end of the novel, 
or fiction, or print. Rather, both it and "The Literature of Replenish 
ment" are about a single, happier question: What is "postmodernism" 
(the "what's next" of American fiction for the last fifteen to twenty 
years)? 
As a contribution to Barth 's discussion of 
"postmodernism," I would 
like to develop two metaphors, one recent bit of literary theory, and one 
more or less 
rhapsodic allusion to an "eternal verity," the human heart, 
love. My purpose for these fragments will not be to tell the Truth about 
postmodernism (no doubt an impossible, in any case an undesirable task), 
but, more modestly, to provide new ways of talking about and looking 
at it, which?when added to what has already been said about post 
modernism, and what remains to be said in the next few decades?will 
eventually constitute postmodernism's saturation, used-upness, and ex 
haustion. In short, this is to be a contribution to the death of what's next. 
Before setting out, I want to emphasize that I have, as Chuck Berry 
sang, "No particular place to go." I have no particular understanding 
or definition to claim privilege for. Postmodernism is usually defined 
through a series of literary historical "sightings." Barth catches a 
glimpse of it in Borges, Nabokov, and Beckett. Alan Wilde sees it in 
Robert Coover, Ronald Suckenick, and Raymond Federman. Feder 
man, with greater depth of perception, sees it as far back as Rabelais, 
and then in Celine and Beckett. The perhaps myopic Jerome Klinkowitz 
can make it out best in the procreative vortex of 1967 in which 
The Atlantic, 245 (1980), 65-71. 
2The Atlantic, 220 (1967), 29-34. 
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Barthelme, Vonnegut, and Kosinski came on the scene. Or postmoder 
nism is defined as a trans-traditional itinerary; one gets to it, through 
Rabelais, Sterne, Joyce, and Gilbert Sorrentino, in the same way that one 
gets to San Jose through San Mateo and Palo Alto. This is a way of saying 
what Nietzsche says in The Genealogy of Morals: "that which has a history 
eludes definition." Postmodernism has no definition as such, and like 
all other literary classifications, it has no pure examples. Its only reality 
is in a system of equivalences and differences. It is like Joyce and unlike 
James. Like Sorrentino and unlike Saul Bellow. This ought to mean that 
postmodernism is nothing in itself, but only whatever we say it is. That 
is, in fact, what I mean. For, as the aesthetician Morris Weitz has argued, 
art is what we as a culture decide it is.3 And surely what goes for art 
in general goes for art's sub-species as well. 
The most I intend to do is to hold a certain kind of mirror (that we 
are used to calling literary commentary) up to the texts that we are used 
to 
calling postmodern and hope that there is recognition. Although we 
may not be able to claim that this recognition is what we used to refer 
to fondly as knowledge, it is much more than nothing. It is a lively, a 
bracing, and?above all else?a practical tautology. As the later Witt 
genstein of the Philosophical Investigations would have argued here, the 
idea of postmodernism may not constitute a truth, but that doesn't make 
it any less useful. We can still use it even if we do not claim for it any 
truth. It can still be a tool. This is to say nothing more than what Barth 
says in "The Literature of Replenishment," that "critical categories are 
as more or less fishy as they are less or more useful." 
As I have already suggested, the writers of the fiction of postmoder 
nism are not so much interested in, or overwhelmed by the idea of 
exhaustion, as they are excited by other possiblities, by what is not yet 
tedious. In fact, contemporary fiction is a literature of great promise, 
productivity, and possibility. It is a literature of monstrous possibility. 
In ?talo Calvino one may find an indication of as well as a metaphor for 
this largeness of possibility in two key related tropes: the regressus in 
infinitum, and the figure of the "monster." 
The wobbly history of the notion of the regressus in infinitum is a 
crucial and indicative one for western culture.4 We may trace it as far 
3"The Role of Theory in Aesthetics," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, XV, No. 1, (1956). 
4For a brief history of this eventful metaphor (through Zeno's paradoxes, Aristotle's "third man," Aquinas' 
"unmoved mover," and Kafka's "imperial messenger"), see Jorge Luis Borges' essay "Avatars of the 
Tortoise." 
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back as Zeno, where it is the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise in 
which movement is proven impossible. For the moving object (Achilles) 
must run half of the distance before reaching its destination, and before 
reaching the half, half of the half, and before half of the half, half of 
the half of the half, and so on. Zeno sought through his paradox to 
discover the contradiction which inheres in the ordinary idea of motion. 
Recently, the significance of the regressus (as paradox and critique of 
the conventional) has again asserted itself, this time, most notably, in 
the thinking of Jacques Derrida. It is the regressus in infinitum, the 
hopelessness of arriving at an ultimate term, that Derrida applies 
"deconstructively" to the desire of phenomenology to determine a 
"transcendental subject."5 As Husserl (whom Derrida critiques at great 
length in Speech and Phenomena) peels back the layers of consciousness 
which wrap themselves tightly about the Cartesian cogito, the causal 
structure of the regressus in infinitum is?at a crucial point?broken, 
ruptured by metaphysics, theology, and desire. Husserl was determined 
to find a privileged, originary break in the chain of causality which he 
called the "I," the cogito, His Majesty the Sovereign Self. Derrida's 
modest but deconstructing reminder to all of metaphysics is that, after 
all, the regressus is the name of a paradox (of an "undecidability"), and 
not, as St. Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, or Husserl would have it, of a 
theological, metaphysical, or phenomenological proof. 
?talo Calvino uses the metaphor of the regressus in infinitum in his 
Cosmicomic-zl story, "A Sign in Space." In it he finds the idea of the 
origin of language caught within the dialectical structure of the regressus. 
The results for his narrator, Qfwfq, and language itself are both bizarre 
and comic. 
I conceived the idea of 
making a sign, that's true enough, or 
rather, I conceived the idea of considering a sign a something 
that I felt like making, so when, at that point in space and 
not in another, I made something, meaning to make a sign, 
it turned out that I really had made a sign, after all. 
Here Calvino wraps himself in the contradictoriness of language 
trying to deliver the facts about its own origin. How conceive, how 
5Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1973). 
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make, how feel? What something, what point, what meaning could 
there be before the first sign? Calvino asserts, comically, the un 
decidability, the utter perplexity of the question of the origin of signs. 
For the existence of a sign is dependent upon the assumption of the 
existence of other signs before it. There is always already an earlier sign. 
I thought about it day and night; in fact, I couldn't think 
about anything else; actually, this was the first opportunity 
I had had to think something; or I should say: to think 
something had never been possible, first because there were 
no things to think about, and second because signs to think 
of them by were lacking, but from the moment there was that 
sign, it was possible for someone thinking to think of a sign, 
and therefore that one, in the sense that the sign was the thing 
you could think about and also the sign of the thing thought, 
namely, itself. 
If it is true that the history of all western thought is the history of 
the fate of a handful of metaphors, the present stature of the regressus 
in infinitum, once again?as in Zeno?a deconstructing paradox, is in 
structive. Through the regressus, an important part of literary postmoder 
nism (certainly Borges, Calvino, and Barth,6 all rooted in Nietzsche and 
Kafka) seems to be saying, in Borges' words, "We . . . have dreamt the 
world. We have dreamt it as firm, mysterious, visible, ubiquitous in 
space and durable in time; but in its architecture we have allowed 
tenuous and eternal crevices of unreason which tell us it is false."7 
If, couched in our postmodern period, we may not speak of origins, 
or dream the world as 
"ubiquitous in space and durable in time" without 
tainting ourselves with theology and metaphysics, how shall we explain 
the 
"presence" of things (you know: chairs, streets, people, bad manners) 
in our stories? What shall we say about them? The ultimate thrust of 
the deconstructions of Zeno, Derrida, Borges, and Calvino is to cut us 
off from time, space and matter, that is to say, from the mimetic 
impulse. But what sort of "reality "can fiction have deprived of all claim 
to 
referentiality? 
One may discern in Calvino two related responses to this question. 
6Note Barth 's use of the regressus in Lost in the Funhouse?moebus strips, mise en abime mirror structures?and 
in Chimera?infinite declensions of tellers and tales. 
7Borges, Labyrinths (New York: New Directions, 1964), p. 208. 
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The first, arrived at, again, in the story "A Sign in Space," is that the 
only reality the cosmos has is the reality of signs. The sign which 
Calvino's Qfwfq created, "inhabited me, possessed me entirely, came 
between me and everything with which I might have attempted to 
establish a relationship." As the story concludes even more forcefully, 
"independent of signs, space didn't exist and perhaps had never existed." 
Although this is a lot, this isn't all Calvino has to say on the question 
of presence. What about, for example, the presence of birds? Calvino 
begins his short story "The Origin of the Birds" (t zero) with Qfwfq 
saying that in order to tell the story of the origin of birds he would have 
to "remember better how a number of things were made, things I've 
long since forgotten; first the thing I now call bird, second what I now 
call I, third the branch, fourth the place where I was looking out, fifth 
all the others." In the place of what Qfwfq had "long since forgotten" 
(origins: how things were made), Calvino supplies the figure of the 
monster, "all those who could exist and didn't." Qfwfq tells the story 
this way: 
One morning I hear some singing, outside, that I have never 
heard before. Or rather (since we didn't yet know what 
singing was), I hear something making a sound that nobody 
has ever made before. I look out. I see an unknown animal 
singing on a branch. He had wings feet tail claws spurs 
feathers plumes fins quills beak teeth crop horns crest wattles 
and a star on his forehead. It was a bird; you've realized that 
already, but I didn't; they had never been seen before. 
The appearance of the bird is profoundly unsettling for Qfwfq and 
his community. The wisest among them, old U(h), speaks to his 
neighbors in the name of tradition. "Don't look at him!" he says. "He's 
a mistake!" But Qfwfq takes a more difficult and risky line. 
Hadn't we been told over and over that everything capable 
of being born from the Reptiles had been born? 
. . . For many 
years we had been tormented by doubts as to who was a 
monster and who wasn't, but that too could be considered 
long settled: all of us who existed were nonmonsters, while 
the monsters were all those who could exist and didn't. . . . 
But if we were going to begin again with strange animals, . 
. . 
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if a creature impossible by definition such a bird was instead 
possible. . . . then the barrier between monsters and nonmon 
sters was 
exploded and everything was possible again. 
What I would like to suggest is that this idea of a presence grounded 
not in 
original birdiness, but rather in a monstrous and disruptive 
paste-up of mutative reptile and fish is not only an important philosophi 
cal idea (because it implicitly denies a metaphysical/theological origin), 
but a crucial literary distinction as well. For there is a monstrous figure 
in the carpet here: the story is told through descriptions of comic strip 
frames. Calvino as author, as much as Qfwfq as character, is "the 
promotor of a process of refusal to see and say things the way they had 
been seen and said up to that very moment."8 
The literature of postmodernism generally aspires to origin as rup 
ture, break, mutation, transformation. It prefers the discontinuous and 
the monstrous to the linear and archetypal. Consider, for example, that 
there is no possibility for the monstrous in Northrop Frye 's mythopoeic 
literary universe. In that cosmos literature's lineage is proper?Hamlet 
rooted in ur-Hamlets rooted in universal myth?and its papers and 
credentials are in order. But from Rabelais' gargantuan, encyclopaedic 
farce, through Fielding's comic epic-poem in prose, Sterne's autobiogra 
phy in utero, Joyce's comic catalogues, Federman's exaggerated second 
hand tale to be read aloud either 
standing or sitting, Barth 's Fiction for 
Print, Tape and Live Voice, and, surely the most appropriate example 
of all, Barth 's triptych, Chimera, the inclination of the postmodern, 
which is to say of the anti-mimetic, has been for the hybrid, for the 
a-generic. Of course, these monstrous genres are meant to show that the 
norms defining monstrosity are themselves "originally" monstrous. 
This is precisely the shock of Qfwfq's insight: the line has been crossed; 
we are all monsters. 
However, aside from the undecidable question of the original consti 
tution of parts, Calvino's monsters (whether biological or literary) are 
always recognizable in their parts. It is never a question of creation from 
nothing, but only of newness as a recombination of previously existing 
parts. Calvino sees the creation of narrative as "a combinatorial game 
which plays on the possibilities intrinsic to its own material." 
This seems to me to be an important theoretical assertion. It is to say 
"Calvino, "Myth in the Narrative," in Surfiction, ed. Raymond Federman (Chicago: The Swallow Press), 
p. 80. 
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that the storyteller is not Shakespeare's old mimeser (with his mirror 
held to nature), nor even, in any simple sense, Joyce's old artificer (that 
high priest to the Imagination), but rather something much more like 
Claude L?vi-Strauss 
' 
bricoleur. In the chapter "The Science of the 
Concrete" in The Savage Mind, Levi-Strauss defines the bricoleur as one 
whose "universe of instruments is closed" and who must "make do with 
whatever is at hand." The bricoleur is 
"imprisoned in the events and 
experiences which [he] never tires of ordering and re-ordering in [his] 
search to find them a meaning."9 
So, the monstrousness of postmodernism's literary possibilities is the 
result, on the one hand, of the debunking or deconstructing of certain 
central conventions of 19th century literary realism (especially of the 
notions of mimesis and genre); and, on the other hand, of the willingness 
to allow narrative's newly released parts to float, mingle and re-cohere. 
The realist values the reassurance of the familiar; the excitable post 
modernist?a curious bricoleur?values the beauty of the new and 
"monstrous." As Qfwfq would say, "the barrier between monsters and 
nonmonsters [is] exploded and everything is possible again" [my italics]. 
As relevant as the regressus in infinitum and the figures of the monster 
and the bricoleur seem to what is central in Calvino's fiction and in 
postmodernism in general, one is forced to admit that most of Calvino's 
tales of Qfwfq in Cosmicomics and t zero are, from a certain perspective, 
pre-eminently recognizable, hardly monstrous, tales of love, loneliness 
and philosophical gloom and glee. Calvino is clearly one who manages, 
as John Barth writes, "to speak eloquently and memorably to our 
still-human hearts and conditions, as the great artists have always done." 
But what does Barth mean by our "still-human hearts and conditions"? 
Is it true of Calvino? And if it is, how does it work with what we have 
to this point characterized as postmodern? 
It seems to me that just beneath the surface of the modernist 
postmodernist tradition, just under its icy theoretical and structural 
speculations, just beyond its often acid criticism of the bourgeois, is a 
stratum of a certain kind of sentimentality. Consider, briefly, Proust's 
Swann's Way. 
Proust's official attitude towards 
"representation" is something like 
9The Savage Mind (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press), p. 22. 
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"one never gets to put down the book." In the opening passage of 
Swann's Way, the narrator has been reading, has put down his book, has 
slept, dreamt and become the subject of his book, and then awoken to 
try to put down the book once more. Consciousness is textual, for Proust, 
and reality is the supplementary "structure of recollection." A place is 
real for the narrating Marcel only if one has heard, or read about it 
beforehand and had time to imagine, and dream about its particular 
character. 
In the same way, Swann's love was nothing in itself, but existed only 
to the extent that he could base it upon his own "sound, aesthetic 
foundation." The truth of his love is, as the narrator points out 
repeatedly, composed not so much by a person, Swann's lover, Odette, 
as by "a face deserving to be found in Botticelli" and a phrase of music. 
Even one's experiences and emotions (that is, one's subjectivity) are 
authored by outside others. For even though the narrator authors 
Swann 's story, Swann 's experiences are more importantly the author of 
the narrator's own experiences in love. For the narrator would never 
have had his feelings for Gilberte (who was also "authored" by Swann) 
if he hadn't known of Swann's feelings for and experiences with Odette. 
He is that distinguished Frenchperson, descendant of Stendahl's Julian 
Sorel and Flaubert's Emma Bovary, who never would have fallen in love 
if he hadn't read about it first. 
And yet in spite of Marcel's lucid speculations on the supplemental 
and textual nature of all experience?especially the romantic?love and 
beauty, as they take their places in his life, are overwhelming. In short, 
the presence of romantic love in Proust's fiction is so central and 
powerful that theory seems ultimately inconsequent: all that we know 
not to be?is utterly real. 
Much the same sort of contradictory impulse exists in Calvino. 
Alongside his rigorous passages on the nature of the cosmos as the realm 
of signs, there is an attitude towards love/sex as a chemical/organic 
foundation, as an originary disposition of living matter or cells (much 
like, perhaps, John Barth 's sperm cells in "Night-Sea Journey" which 
launch themselves into the unknown with the cry of "Love! Love! 
Love!"). Take, for example, this passage from the story "The Distance 
of the Moon" in Cosmicomics. Qfwfq is trying to overcome the attraction 
of the moon?which, in this story, hangs at only a distance of yards from 
the earth. 
135 
"Hold on! Hold on to us!' they shouted at me, and in all that 
groping, sometimes I ended up by seizing one of Mrs. Vhd 
Vhd's breasts, which were round and firm, and the contact 
was good and secure and had an attraction as strong as the 
Moon's or even stronger, especially if I managed, as I plunged 
down, to put my other arm around her hips, and with this 
I passed back into our world. 
Thus, Calvino's cosmic character settles on the breast of the lover, in 
the breast of the mother, in the breast of nature, in the breast of the 
cosmos. 
Most of Calvino's stories are about either the change caused by 
biological evolution or the change caused by distancing (the gradual, or 
exploding expansion of the universe). Evolution from a happy original 
state when, as in the story "Blood, Sea" (t zero), we were present in the 
sea and the sea was present in us; and expansion in the cosmos to the 
point were the galaxies are "gradually reduced to the last tail of the last 
luminous ray," become metaphors for loneliness which create, in turn, 
a powerful nostalgia for lost origins. 
In "The Spiral," a story about the social life of a molusc, we glimpse 
this radiant origin: 
I knew that some of the others were female. The water 
transmitted a special vibration, a kind of brrrum brrrum 
brrrum, I remember when I became aware of it the first time, 
or rather, not the first, I remember when I became aware of 
it as a thing I had always known. At the discovery of these 
vibrations' existence, I was seized with a great curiosity, not 
so much to see them, or to be seen by them either . . . but a 
curiosity to know whether something would happen between 
me and them. A desperation filled me, a desire not to do 
anything special, which would have been out of place, know 
ing that there was nothing special to do, or nonspecial either, 
but to respond in some way to that vibration with a corre 
sponding vibration, or rather, with a personal vibration of my 
own, because, sure enough, there was something there that 
wasn't exactly the same as the other, I mean now you might 
say it came from hormones, but for me it was very beau 
tiful .... In other words, I had fallen in love. 
136 
This caring or this nostalgia, this sentiment or this generosity, this 
desire to spare love from what is otherwise a thorough and materialist 
critique of certain philosophies, myths and romances which have domi 
nated our literature and culture since the 19th century and before, this, 
too, is a prominent part of both modernism and postmodernism. It can 
be found in Molly Bloom's universal "yes," in the helping touch of the 
hands of "the ladies" in Kafka's "The Hunger Artist," in Humbert 
Humbert's 
rhapsodic, albeit glandular, desires, negatively in any num 
ber of Donald Barthelme's "sad" stories (like"Critique de la Vie Quo 
tidienne"), and in the tireless love of Lady Amherst and Ambrose 
Mensch in John Barth 's Letters. "Love" is, perhaps, that baby in the 
bathwater of realism that much postmodernism does not for the moment 
care, or dare, to throw out. Without it there is, perhaps, only that 
terrifying loneliness which, as Wallace Stevens put it, is "nothing to 
have at heart." 
I would like finally to retreat a step in my argument in order to say 
that postmodernism, even though it values and uses the figure of the 
monster, is no recent disruption or monster itself (except perhaps as an 
eternally recurring monster). Postmodernism is the locus of a "crisis of 
language" (Roland Barthes) which is at least as old as Rabelais and, if 
we knew where to look for it, certainly older. It is, simply, a part of 
the Other Tradition of anti-mimesis, that much vilified and unholy 
mirror reflection of F.R. Leavis' Great Tradition. Now, this would be 
no great thing, and postmodernism could make for itself no claim for 
great or surprising profundity, except for the fact that the relationship 
between the two has been highly charged with cultural, ideological, and 
political values. The need to react against the orthodoxy of realism is 
more than what John Barth contends, that is, it is more than a simple 
matter of the exhaustion of 19th century and modernist modes. For the 
confrontation between realism and 
"experimentalism" is not only a 
narrow, provincial, literary dispute, it is also part of a broader ideological 
battle between not necessarily but factually combative epistemologies. 
Realism has become a State Fiction, a part of the machinery of the 
political state. It is through the conventions of Realism that the State 
explains to its citizens the relationship between themselves and Nature, 
economics, politics, and their own sexuality. This massive epistemol?gi 
ca! exercise takes place every day, right before our eyes on television, 
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in the movies, in Time magazine, in the simple-minded, relational 
rhetoric of politicians, and so on. What postmodernism has done and 
continues to do is oppose any totalizing fiction of life, that which, in 
Calvino's words, seeks "to confirm and consecrate the established order 
of things." 
Of course, ideally, the two sides could live peacefully. The fact of the 
matter is that they cannot live separately (although that fact can be 
occluded or denied for political reasons). The mimetic needs the anti 
mimetic if it is not to become redundant and authoritarian; it needs the 
consciousness and the good conscience of its own ultimately fictive base 
(which the anti-mimetic provides). Likewise, the anti-mimetic needs to 
be aware that it is always at some level part of what it critiques. It needs 
the as-if of referentiality unless it desires to break down into "writing 
at the zero degree," or "white writing," or the Writerly, or any other 
dream text of the avant-garde, the only knowledge of which we have 
is that there are no examples of it.10 This is to say that no texts are 
mimetic and that, nevertheless, all texts must behave, at some level, as 
if they were. In short, mimesis and anti-mimesis, realism and exper 
imentalism are oppositions which exist only through an exercise of 
force, and which, therefore, tell us as much about the politics of our own 
time as they do about language or literature. 
And so, finally, Calvino is an exemplary postmodernist not only 
because he is one of those few people "whose artistic thinking is as hip 
as any French novelist's, but who manages nonetheless to speak to our 
still-human hearts and conditions," but also because, as Barth does not 
seem to consider, Calvino sees the confrontation between modernism 
postmodernism and realism not as a narrowly literary dispute, but rather 
as an important part of a much larger cultural confrontation over the 
frontiers of knowledge and power. This overtly political aim is implicit 
in his fiction, implicit particularly in the way his play with science fact 
disrupts our conventional understanding of the world. But Calvino is 
explicit in his essay, "Myth in the Narrative": 
When written literature comes into being, it already bears the 
burden of the duty to confirm and consecrate the established 
order of things, a burden from which it slowly frees itself. . . 
[in order to] express the very oppressions [it] labors beneath, 
'"Roland Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, trans. A. La vers (New York: Hill and Wang, 1953) and S/Z, trans. 
Richard Miller, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974). 
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to bring them to full consciousness and to transmit this 
consciousness to the culture and thought of a whole society.11 
"Calvino, p. 80-81. 
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